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Using the concept of reciprocal socialization, this article argues that the DamascuseMo-
scow partnership has been since 1970 a reciprocal constitutive relation that has inﬂuenced
considerably the actions, interests, and identities of the two partners. During the last two
decades of the Cold War it represented an almost ideal-type example of a relationship
between a super-power and its regional ally that, through its complex consequences,
shaped signiﬁcantly the two partners themselves, the Middle Eastern political and security
environment, and the international system as a whole. Post-2003 developments and
especially the present Syrian crisis also have inﬂuenced considerably the two states'
identity-building processes. After the US invasion of Iraq, the patterns of renewed bilateral
cooperation have mirrored, at least in part, the Cold War ones. The Arab Spring enforced
this trend. Yet, today the International Relations identity of Russia is quite different from
the Soviet era one. The main consequence is that Moscow's new identity prevents it from
supporting the regime in Damascus at any cost. If military operations take a turn threat-
ening seriously the survival of that regime, it is likely that the Kremlin will not escalate its
pro-al-Asad involvement, thus accepting the possible fall of its Middle Eastern ally.
Copyright © 2015, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction Russia's new identity, it concludes that the Kremlin usesThis article uses the concept of reciprocal socialization
in order to show that since 1970 the DamascuseMoscow
partnership has been a reciprocal constitutive relation that
has inﬂuenced considerably the actions, interests, and
identities of the two partners. Moreover, since the US in-
vasion of Iraq, the patterns of renewed bilateral coopera-
tion have mirrored, at least in part, the Cold War ones. The
Arab Spring has enforced this trend. The article examines in
what way this is relevant for the future of the Moscow's
support for the regime in Damascus. Based on an analysis of.
arch Center, Hanyang
nter, Hanyang University. Prodthe renewed Syrian partnership in order to reassert its
great power status but is not ready to support that regime
at any cost. If military operations take a turn threatening
seriously the survival of the latter, it is likely that the
Kremlin will not escalate its pro-al-Asad involvement, thus
accepting the possible fall of its Middle Eastern ally.
The article is organized as follows: section 2 creates the
appropriate theoretical framework. Sections 3e5 depict the
historical development of the SyrianeRussian relationship.
Sections 6e11 present its evolution during the Arab Spring.
The article's ﬁndings are analysed in the ﬁnal section.
2. A special type of reciprocal socialization
Constructivism states that actors of international re-
lations are permanently involved in socialization anduction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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identities. In turn, the interaction of states modiﬁes their
international environment, sometimes changing the very
‘culture’ of international anarchy. Identity can be deﬁned as
‘relatively stable, role-speciﬁc understandings and expec-
tations about self’ representing ‘a property of international
actors that generates motivational and behavioral disposi-
tions’ (Wendt, 1999: 224; a discussion of the ‘identity
literature of IR’ can be found in Flockhart, 2006: 94e97).
Identities change due to international socialization that can
be deﬁned as ‘a process in which states are induced to
adopt the constitutive rules of an international community’
(Schimmelfennig, Engert,& Knobel, 2006: 2). Its outcome is
sustained compliance based on the internalization of new
norms. The actor switches from following a logic of con-
sequences to a logic of appropriateness (Checkel, 2005:
804). Jeffrey Checkel identiﬁed two types of international
socialization. The simpler, Type I internalization or social-
ization makes states behave appropriately by learning a
role. The more advanced Type II socialization goes beyond
role playing. Actors accept community or organizational
norms as ‘the right thing to do.’ They ‘adopt the interests, or
even possibly the identity, of the community of which they
are a part’ (Checkel, 2005: 804).
In most cases, it is assumed that some states are already
socialized in a community or organization while others
need to be adopted into the club of socialized members.
Very many international socialization studies analyse this
type of one-way process. However, sometimes new mem-
bers try to renegotiate the current order of the community
that receives them through ‘reciprocal socialization’
(Terhalle, 2011: 342, 349), a process that mirrors Wendt's
image of states modifying their international environment.
Another frequent assumption is that there is a socializing
community that reunites a relatively large number of
states. This article explores a special type of reciprocal so-
cialization: that taking place within the special bilateral
relations between a great power and its regional ally. On
the one hand, the inﬂuence is mutual; both partners
change their identities. On the other hand, this is an
asymmetrical process with the great power playing the
major role. It has largely superior material resources and a
favourable position in cognitive terms resulting from its
experience with other, possibly numerous regional allies.
Therefore, it is the great power that establishes the so-
cializing norms. Yet, because it is a state and not a large and
complex community, the great power itself is vulnerable to
the inﬂuence of the regional ally and might change its own
identity in a certain measure. Of course, both states are also
submitted to diverse external inﬂuences and interact with
other actors that inﬂuence them. Yet, depending on the
intensity and importance of their bilateral relations, the
latter can inﬂuence considerably the key features of the
two states' International Relations identity through a pro-
cess that is very similar to that described by Jeffrey Checkel.
In the ﬁrst stage, each of the two partners learns to take
advantage of the opportunities offered by the new rela-
tionship while assuming its speciﬁc role. The regional ally
adapts its global foreign policy orientation to that of the
great power while using the support of its partner in order
to increase its regional status and inﬂuence. The greatpower uses its ally as a proxy in regional affairs and takes
advantage of this extension of its international reach in
order to enhance its global status. Progressively, this goes
beyond role playing. The two partners switch from a logic
of consequences to one of appropriateness, to quote
Checkel once more. A superior level of socialization is
reached, with the two states profoundly and durably
inﬂuencing each other.
Moreover, this process is likely to have signiﬁcant re-
percussions on the domestic characteristics of the two
partners and especially on those of the local ally.
Frequently, this is a medium or relatively small state
located in a turbulent region. The support of an external
great power increases considerably the resources, legiti-
macy, and stability of the regime in place. Its leader ac-
quires the means to increase his control of the local society,
which is likely to result in the creation and/or the consol-
idation of a strong authoritarian regime.
The DamascuseMoscow partnership is an excellent case
study showing that the identities of the two partners were
inﬂuenced considerably by their intense interaction. The
Syrian regime could develop into a domestic dictatorship
and a key regional player only due to Moscow's support;
faced a major crisis from the end of the Cold War to Putin's
Middle Eastern comeback; and returned to ‘normality’ only
with the renewal of the Russian partnership. Symmetrically,
Moscow used Syria as a valuable regional agent that
enhanced its superpower status during the ColdWar; had to
abandon it during its own profound crisis of the 1990s; and
turned its support for the al-Asad regime into a means of
reasserting its own great power status during the Arab
Spring. Therefore, it can be stated that, for more than four
decades, the ups and downs of the DamascuseMoscow
partnership have put in relation two mutually constitutive
International Relations identities whose socializing interac-
tion is illustrative of the theoretical model presented above.
3. The Syrian authoritarian construct
The present Syrian regime originates in the Ba'th coup
d'etatof8March1963. In February1966, the left-wing faction
of the Ba'th Party headed by Salah Jadid and Haﬁz al-Asad
defeated its rival and took power. Finally, in November
1970 the young and ambitious minister of defence, Haﬁz al-
Asad, imposed his personal dictatorship (Karsh, 1991: 5;
Rabinovich, 2011: 117). In a country with a majority of Sunni
Muslims (60 percent), Asad relied on the 'Alawi community
(12 percent). Due to religious reasons, manymembers of the
Sunni majority refused to accept a regime dominated by
'Alawis as legitimate (Rabinovich, 2011: 374). This hardly
favoured the new regime's stability. Consequently, Asad
increased repression and operated a vast network of police
informers andagents. He createdno less thanﬁfteen security
agencies numbering 50,000 employees (Rubin, 2007: 52).
Political power resided in the hands of the President and of
the small group of trusted conﬁdants which constituted the
core of his regime. Haﬁz al-Asad also became the object of an
aggressive cult of personality (Rabinovich, 2011: 118).
Extremely brutal repression was used against political
enemies. The 1979e82 Sunni Islamist rebellion was
brought to an end by the Hama massacre; between 10,000
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2009). At the same time, Asad built e for the ﬁrst time in
Syria's modern history e a powerful state and provided his
country with stability and an important role in regional
politics (Rabinovich, 2011: 374). This was remarkable for a
regime that had to control a highly turbulent society while
facing a threatening regional environment (which brought
non-fatal but repeated military defeat at the hands of
Israel). The Syrian state simply did not have the resources
required by these formidable tasks. The success was mainly
due to the special relationship built by the Middle Eastern
dictator with the Soviet Union.
4. The Soviet Connection
A previous SovieteSyrian honeymoon, initiated in 1954,
came to an end in February 1958 following the Egyp-
tianeSyrian merger (Karsh, 1991: 5). It was re-launched
after 1966 and became ‘the most enduring and uninter-
rupted tie that the USSR has maintained with any Middle
Eastern leader in the post-war era.’ In fact, before 1970 Asad
had a record of outspoken criticism of Syria's growing
dependence on the Soviets (Karsh, 1991: 6) and initially
didn't seem predisposed to increase it. Yet, he progressively
came to realize the vital importance of a strong external
supporter. After Egypt's defection, Syria became Moscow's
major regional ally and a recipient of vast military and
economic support. During his ﬁrst three years in power,
Haﬁz visited Moscow six times. Soviet arms exports to Syria
reached $825 million in 1977, $1 billion in 1978 (Rubin,
2007: 55) and an average of $2.3 billion per year until
1985 (Golan, 1990: 279). Overall, the USSR supplied around
$25 billion in military equipment and trained about 10,000
Syrian ofﬁcers (Rubin, 2007: 55). Therefore, it was Soviet aid
and support which, to a considerable extent, enabled Asad
to transform Syria from a weak country into a regional po-
litical and military power (Karsh, 1991: 6). Crucially, this
allowed Damascus to remain one of the most resolute ad-
versaries of Israel. In turn, this and especially the 1973 war
‘endowed the regime with a measure of nationalist legiti-
macy’ (Hinnebusch, 2012: 97) that signiﬁcantly strength-
ened Asad's rule. In the larger context of the Cold War, the
Soviet alliance placed Syria resolutely in the anti-Western
camp and created a durable pattern of enmity between
Damascus and the West. Overall, it is not an exaggeration to
say that the SyrianeSoviet partnership was constitutive of
the al-Asad regime. Moscow provided the military, political,
diplomatic, and economic support that allowed the dictator,
domestically, to impose his brutal control on the Syrian
society and, internationally, to remain the constant adver-
sary of vastly superior Israel. This is to say that two of the
deﬁning features of the regime in Damascus, its brutal
authoritarianism and its overtly anti-Israeli and anti-
Western orientation, might have not existed in the
absence of the Kremlin's multifaceted assistance. Of course,
the situation should not be perceived as similar to that of
Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. The Ba'thist form of Na-
tional Socialism was clearly different from communism.
Based on al-Asad's perception of regional dynamics, Syrian
foreign policy decisions were at times different from or even
contrary to those of the USSR. The Damascus regimepreserved, domestically and internationally, a signiﬁcant
degree of autonomy. However, while avoiding satellisation,
Syria's identity was shaped strongly by the Soviet
partnership.
5. Adapting to Unipolarity
Given Syria's heavy reliance on the USSR, the end of the
Cold War and the waning of Moscow's support weakened
considerably Asad's position. As a senior Syrian ofﬁcial
stated, ‘weregret the Soviet collapsemore than theRussians
do’ (Rubin, 2007: 55). In the new circumstances, the regime
initially decided to join the American-led coalition and took
part in thewar against Iraq, implicitly laying the foundation
for a new relationship withWashington (Rabinovich, 2009:
3). Yet, the failure of the March 2000 al-Asad-Clinton
summit in Geneva put an end to the Syrian-American
rapprochement (Rabinovich, 2009: 7). Three months later,
Haﬁz al-Asad died. He left a dreadful economy, a stagnant
society, and a situation of regional and international isola-
tion (Rubin, 2007: 131). The regime nevertheless survived
under the leadership of Haﬁz's son, Bashar al-Asad.
The new President's ‘modernizing authoritarianism’
introduced some change. A reform program was adopted
that continued and deepened the economic liberalization
begun under Haﬁz. There was a replacement of the old
guard which transferred power to a new generation of
technocrats (Hinnebusch, 2010: 8e9). Yet, the major fea-
tures of the old regime e including the authoritarian and
repressive ones e were fully preserved. Essentially, the
present Syrian regime is the same as the one created by
Haﬁz al-Asad more than four decades ago. This is equally
true for foreign policy. The new leader initially accommo-
dated the US after 9/11 by offering some intelligence
sharing and cooperation against al-Qaeda. However, the old
siege mentality prevailed. The American military presence
in Iraq was perceived as a major threat. In response, Syria
became the main gateway for the anti-US ‘Sunni insurrec-
tion.’ It also continued to support Hezbollah and the Pal-
estinian terrorist groups (Rabinovich, 2009: 12) and was
Iran's ally in the anti-American ‘axis of resistance’
(Hinnebusch, 2010: 20; Rabinovich, 2011: 374). Progres-
sively, the hostility of both the Bush Administration and the
French President Jacques Chirac reached levels remindful of
the Cold War era. Yet, in 2008 the new French President
Nicolas Sarkozy ‘embraced Asad and invited him to appear
as an honoured guest at France's Bastille day celebrations’
(Hinnebusch, 2010: 19). In 2009, detente with France was
accompanied by Turkish-sponsored peace talks with Israel
and a cautious dialogue with the new Obama administra-
tion. It was clear that the signiﬁcant improvement of the
relations with theWest was impossible without addressing
the long-lasting Syrian-Israeli enmity. However, Barry
Rubin identiﬁed no less than ﬁfteen strategic, regional, and
domestic reasons why Syria ‘needed the conﬂict to
continue and saw real peace as dangerous, even fatal, to its
survival’ (Rubin, 2007: 110e112). Asad perceived peace
with Israel as endangering Syria's (and his regime's) sta-
bility. He therefore chose to remain a member of the Iran-
led ‘resistance axis.’ Accordingly, he made constant efforts
in order to enhance security and economic relations with
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American invasion of Iraq (see below). As it would become
obvious in 2011 and 2012, the new DamascuseMoscow
relationship enhanced visibly Asad's international position
as well as the repressive capability of his regime. It is
obvious that the Syrian dictator had in mind the Cold War
situation and did everything in his power to recover at least
in part the formidable advantages associated with the
Kremlin's unconditional support.
6. The Syrian Spring
During the 2000s, new information and communication
technologies e including satellite television and social
media e led to the rise of a new Arab public sphere based
on the internalization of a new kind of pan-Arab identity.
This process was accompanied by a generational change. A
frustrated youth population confronted ‘hopeless econo-
mies, rampant corruption, blocked politics, and indifferent,
abusive state institutions.’ Once ignited, the Arab Spring
‘unfolded as a single, uniﬁed narrative of protest with (… ) a
deeply felt sense of shared destiny’ (Lynch, 2012: 8, 10, 12).
The Syrian Ba'th regime was ‘a predatory state’ that did
nothing to alleviate the situation of citizens resenting
major socio-economic frustrations, extremely poor gover-
nance, corruption, and high levels of repression (Wieland,
2011: 45, 47). Consequently, as elsewhere in the Middle
East, there was the sudden mobilization of desperate youth
by the new social media; the emergence of a new opposi-
tion unconnected to the traditional opposition groups,
amorphous but effective; and, speciﬁc to Syria, incitement
by al-Jazeera under the inspiration of Shaykh Yusuf al-
Qardawi who set out to topple 'the ‘Alawit regime’
(Rabinovich, 2011: 374).
The ﬁrst signiﬁcant demonstrations were held on 15
March 2011. On 30 March Bashar al-Asad disappointed the
protesters with a speech that did not offer concrete reforms
and claimed that the agitation was produced from abroad
through local agents (Rabinovich, 2011: 375-6). This led to
increased activism. The reaction of the regime developed
through three increasingly violent phases. At ﬁrst, there
were limited political concessions coupled with brutal
repression. When this failed, the so-called security solution
was set in motion in late July 2011. It sought to force entire
communities into submission, mainly through the privati-
zation of violence initiated by the security services. The
bloody actions of civilian militias known as shabbiha came
to symbolize the regime's brutality and lawlessness, but
were unable to suppress the opposition movement. Finally,
in late January 2012 the so-called military solution was
launched: ‘a scorched earth policy of rampant destruction
and looting.’ It ‘turned what once was viewed as a national
army into a broadly reviled occupation force’ (International
Crisis Group 2012: i, 4). The brutality of the repression was
well illustrated by the 25 May 2012 massacre in Houla that
left 108 dead, including 49 children (The Guardian, 1 June
2012). By 31 December 2013 around 130,000 Syrians had
been killed (The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 31
December 2013). The regime itself was progressively
reduced to its repressive apparatus, a ‘broadly cohesive,
hard-core faction ﬁghting an increasingly bitter, ﬁerce andnaked struggle for collective survival’ e that is, ‘an entity
more akin to a militia than an army in both make-up and
ethos ’ (International Crisis Group 2012: ii).
One would expect this major domestic mutation to have
altered considerably Syria's International Relations iden-
tity, with the aggressive, militaristic dimension turning
dominant. Actually, this did not happen. In an emotionally
charged January 2013 speech at the Opera House in Dam-
ascus, President al-Asad explained once more that his
fatherland is simply ‘repelling a ﬁerce outside aggression in
a new disguise’ as hostile states send foreigners e ‘takﬁris,
terrorists, al-Qaeda members calling themselves Jihadis’ e
to ‘rebel against the people.’ The Syrian regime, however, is
proposing a negotiated political settlement to stop the
bloodshed. More importantly, international support from
‘Russia, China and the BRICS’ is acknowledged. These states
‘won't agree to meddling in the internal affairs of countries
and destabilizing the region,’ thus showing that ‘theWest is
not the entire international community’ (Al-Assad, 6
January 2013). The fear of a Libyan-type Western inter-
vention was obvious and it had strongly encouraged the
regime to preserve an apparently peaceful and conciliatory
proﬁle. Still, it would be naive to believe that al-Asad really
hoped to convince the West of his good intentions. The
fundamental cause of his choice was the international
support mobilized by the Russian ally: a ‘good guy’ image
was what Moscow needed in order to defend Damascus at
the UN. If Jeffrey Checkel's two types of international so-
cialization are taken into consideration, it can easily be
noted that the Syrian regime learned a role and has kept
playing it. This has happened since the very beginning of
the crisis. On 26 February 2012, one month after the
beginning of the ‘military solution,’ al-Asad even held a
referendum that approved a new, ‘reformist’ constitution
(The Economist, 3 March 2012e). This process of interna-
tional socialization most likely originated as a self-
conceived propaganda strategy. Still, it soon became
implicitly Russian-fuelled and cannot be abandoned as long
as Moscow supports the regime. If the latter survives, in the
long run it might well go beyond role playing, with Dam-
ascus fully interiorizing the idea that showing a human face
(despite the harsh realities of armed repression) is ‘the
right thing to do.’ In any case, no matter the level of inte-
riorization, this is a further dimension of Syria's broader
socialization under the inﬂuence e and in order to fully
take advantage e of its partnership with the Kremlin.
Lack of space prevents me from presenting the very
diversiﬁed Syrian opposition and the tortuous path that on
11 November 2012 ﬁnally allowed all its groups to form the
Syrian National Coalition for Revolutionary and Opposition
Forces (El País, 29 November 2012a) which, on 19 March
2013 elected Ghassan Hitto as Prime Minister of an interim
government (CBS, 19 March 2013). At least in part, this was
possible due to foreign actors. Their considerable political
and ﬁnancial involvement was instrumental in reaching a
relative consensus that would have been otherwise
impossible. Overall, the Syrian conﬂict has acquired an
increasingly important international dimension. The bal-
ance between the two camps e and therefore the issue of
the civil war e seems to depend in a large measure on the
actions of external actors.
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Again, lack of space does not allow me to analyse the
regional actors. In fact, a certain balance took shape be-
tween the Saudis, their Gulf allies, and Turkey (who all
support the rebels) and pro-al-Asad Iran. Consequently, the
situation might change rapidly and decisively only due to
actions taken at a higher level, with the West and Russia
playing the key roles.
After an initial wait and see episode, the then US Sec-
retary of State Hillary Clinton stated in July 2011 ‘from our
perspective, he [Asad] has lost legitimacy’ (Sharp 2011: 13).
Sanctions were imposed byWashington on 10 August 2011
(The Economist, 13 August 2011). From 15 November both
the US and EU enforced an embargo on imports of Syrian
oil (Reuters, 28 November 2011). At the 1 April 2012
meeting in Istanbul there was ‘a strident declaration from
the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, that “we cannot sit
back and wait any longer”.’ At that point the US pledged
solely humanitarian aid and communication equipment
(The Economist, 7 April 2012f), but after the May 2012
Houla massacre, ‘ofﬁcials in Britain, France and the United
States have all said that military intervention “cannot be
ruled out” in due course. (… ) calls for intervention, espe-
cially in Washington, are growing’ (The Economist, 9 June
2012h). On 20 August 2012 President Obama stated that
the use by the Syrian regime of chemical or biological
weapons would trigger American military action (The
Guardian, 20 August 2012). The Syrian National Coalition
for Revolutionary and Opposition Forces created in
November 2012 was immediately recognized as the
‘legitimate representative of the Syrian people’ by France
followed, on 11 December 2012, by one hundred other
states, including the US (El País, 29 November 2012a; El
Pais, 12 December 2012b).
At ﬁrst view, the 2011e2012 general development of the
Syrian crisis seemed to duplicate the 2011 Libyan pattern.
The key difference, however, was the West's unwillingness
to involve itself effectively in the Syrian civil war. A number
of important reasons made direct intervention very un-
popular. First, with only 7 million people, Libya had a front-
line and a terrain more vulnerable to aerial attack. 23 m
Syria is more densely populated. Due to heavier weapons, it
might be a ‘hard nut militarily to crack’ (The Economist, 28
April 2012c). Second, there is a ‘diverse population in a
tangle of sectarian and tribal knots,’ with the serious risk of
dragging the country into an Iraq-type prolonged proxy war
(The Economist, 28 April 2012c). Third, the regional context
is different. In contrast to Libya's isolation, Damascus is
strongly supported by neighbouring Iran, which provides a
certain level of military assistance. Fourth, also at regional
level, there is the border shared by Syria and Israel. On 30
April 2011, Rami Makhluf, Bashar al-Asad's cousin and the
family's banker, stated explicitly that ‘if there is no stability
here, there is no way there will be stability in Israel’
(Rabinovich, 2011: 377). In other words, the Syrian regime
threatened to respond to foreign interventionwith an attack
on Israel that all regional and external actors want to pre-
vent. Fifth, President Obama is clearly unwilling to risk
repeating the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan (Cebeci
& Üstün, 2012: 21) and is more cautious than a RepublicanPresident might have been. Sixth, unlike Libya, Syria can
count on the support of Moscow.
The ensuing Western reluctance to intervene has two
important consequences. On the one hand, it helps prolong
the civil war. On the other, it gives prominence to diplo-
matic negotiations and international political statements.
These elements have been used effectively by Russia in its
efforts to support the Syrian regime and, equally important,
in instrumentalizing this support in order to consolidate its
own great power status.
8. Russia's Middle Eastern comeback
During the 1990s, Moscow's diminished international
status was accompanied by a foreign policy focused on the
former Soviet republics and the United States (Freedman,
2010: 51). The relations with the Middle East were greatly
inﬂuenced by bureaucratic and technocratic groups such as
the Russian private sector located in Iraq and by interest
communities within the Middle East (especially the Russian
diaspora in Israel). Consequently, theKremlin's policy towards
that region was heavily inﬂuenced by the new bureaucratic
and technocrat circles lacking a long term strategy; and was
captive to the diplomacy of Israel, Iran, and Iraq, which were
able to secure Russian support (Dagi, 2007: 126; for de-
velopments during the Foreign Minister tenures of Andrei
Kozyrev and Yevgeny Primakov see Freedman, 2010: 51).
It was Putin's success in progressively eliminating cen-
tres of domestic oppositionwhich challenged the authority
of the President that enabled him to take full control in the
ﬁeld of foreign and security policy and to introduce a new
approach to theMiddle East. Chronologically, this coincided
with the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which
were accompanied by the establishment of US military
bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia (Dagi, 2007:
128e129). Washington's support for the Coloured Revolu-
tions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan further increased
Moscow's perception of anAmerican threat in its traditional
zone of inﬂuence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russian
actions in the Middle East were conceived as an attempt to
balance American regional inﬂuence (Dagi, 2007: 129) and
therefore reﬂected clearly the emerging rivalry between the
former ColdWar enemies. Putin decided to formulate a new
Middle Eastern strategy at the end of 2004. From that point
on, the Kremlin followed a complex policy of encouraging
themain anti-American and anti-Israeli forces in theMiddle
East e Syria, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah e while at the
same time trying to draw the major Sunni Arab states e
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and the United Arab Emiratese
away from their alignment with the United States, and also
trying to maintain good bilateral ties with Israel. There was
also the effort of preventing all Arab and Muslim states and
groups from aiding the rebellion in Chechnya, which led to
Russia receiving observer status in the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (Freedman, 2010: 54e59).
While important, these geopolitical considerations tend
to hide a fundamental aspect. Domestically, Putin elimi-
nated all centres of opposition. This changed radically the
way Russian Foreign Policy was made. In turn, this allowed
the adoption of a completely newMiddle Eastern approach
that parallels and mirrors Moscow's increasingly assertive
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this represents a clear change of Russia's International Re-
lations identity. The feeble, passive Yeltsin-era actor has
been replaced by a rejuvenated, vocal great power that
wants to play a major global and Middle Eastern role. The
Syrian crisis has been instrumental in this process.
9. The Russian perception of the Arab Spring
The term ‘Arab Spring’ has been infrequent in main-
stream Russian analysis of Middle Eastern developments.
The preferred key words have been ‘destabilization,’
‘turmoil,’ and ‘extremism’ e an eloquent description of
what Pavel Baev labelled ‘Russia's counter-revolutionary
stance’ (Baev, 2011: 11). Indeed, the Kremlin's perception
of and reaction to the Arab protest movements has been
based on a conspiracy theory strongly marked by two
interconnected dimensions. On the one hand, there is
Moscow's solidarity with authoritarian regimes in the
Middle East, which it perceives as ‘organic to the region’
(Baev, 2011: 13). On the other hand, the fall of these re-
gimes is associated with an increase in Western geopolit-
ical inﬂuence. The then President Dmitry Medvedev spoke
about a plot as early as February 2011, adding that ‘in the
past such a scenario was harboured for us’ (President of
Russia, 22 February 2011). Western secret services were
accused of experimenting a ‘controlled chaos’ strategy
(Baev, 2011: 13). More realistically, the Arab Spring allowed
the coming to power of new Islamic actors that are likely to
consolidate the anti-Iranian bloc. Consequently, therewas a
visible change in Russia's previous Middle Eastern policy
favouring the ‘resistance axis’ but also courting Sunni
states. In a context of open rivalry with the United States,
Moscow now decided to limit the Saudi-inspiredWahhabi-
style of Islamic activism while increasing its cooperation
with Iran (Bacik, 2012: 4).
Syria is, of course, the case in point, but it was the Libyan
episode that had a special importance in completing the
construction of the Kremlin's new general Middle Eastern
approach. In April 2011, Putin surprisingly described Qad-
daﬁ's regime as ‘a warped and ugly monarchy.’ Yet, he
insisted that ‘on the whole [it] satisﬁes the local public
mentality and political practice’ (Baev, 2011: 13). Bilateral
relations had improved in previous years. President Putin
visited Tripoli in April 2008. He wrote off Libya's Soviet-era
$4.6 billion debt and signed a host of new contracts, the
largest being a $3 billion railroad deal. That same year, a
Russian missile frigate as well as a naval task force led by
the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky visited the
Libyan capital. Despite normalized relations with Wash-
ington, Qadhaﬁ declared that he was willing to host a
Russian naval base that ‘would prevent possible attacks by
the United States’ (Ria Novosti 2008). He was certainly
shocked to ﬁnd out that Russia did not veto the March 2011
UN Security Council Resolution 1973 which led to the
Western military intervention in Libya. Most likely, the
cause was a temporary divergence of views between the
resolutely anti-Western Prime Minister Putin and the
milder President Medvedev. Possibly due to French and
American pressure, the latter accepted the resolution and
even reprimanded Putin publicly for describing it as ‘ﬂawedand inadequate’ and using terms like ‘crusade.’ Yet, during
the followingmonths that sawWestern direct involvement
in the Libyan civil war Medvedev gradually drifted to
Putin's position (Baev, 2011: 15). On 21 October 2011, one
day after Qadhaﬁ's capture and killing at the hands of the
rebels, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused
NATO of war crimes due to its responsibility in the Libyan
leader's death (Ria Novosti 2011). The Russians claimed
they were misled e or betrayed e into signing up to regime
change. ‘To Mr Putin the conclusion from Libya is clear: this
was a big political error, not to be repeated over Syria or
anywhere else’ (The Economist, 9 June 2012g). In other
words, the pro-Western Libyan parenthesis proved to
everybody at the Kremlin, Medvedev included, that there
was no alternative to the Putin-engineered great power
path. Russia's new identity could only be enforced by
Moscow-Tripoli-type partnerships that implicitly enhanced
the Kremlin's regional and global great power status. The
failure to support a Middle Eastern ally could only be
detrimental to Russia's international prestige, regional
position, and internal self-conﬁdence.
10. The RussianeSyrian post-Cold War relations
It was only in 1998 that, for the ﬁrst time since the end of
the ColdWar, Hafez al-Asad visitedMoscowand theRussians
decided to sell sophisticated weaponry to Syria. The ﬁrst, $2
billion contract was signed in 2000. Relations improved
greatly at the end of 2003 and especially in 2004e2005, due
to the American invasion of Iraq (Tawil & Mostajo, 2009:
775e778). However, Putin's warming relationship with
Israel during the same period affected Russia's strategic
choices regarding Syria. Contracts concerning missiles and
advanced air defence systemswere repeatedly cancelled due
to Israeli pressure (Bourtman, 2006). Despite this limitation,
Moscow represented the only great powerwilling to support
the regime in Damascus which was internationally isolated
and faced increasing US and French hostility. During Bashar
al-Asad's January 2005 Moscow visit, Putin agreed to write
off 73 percent of Syria's $13.4 billion debt to the former So-
viet Union (Freedman, 2010: 55). The Syriandictator spoke to
students at the Moscow State Institute of International Re-
lations about Russia's ‘very large’ role in international affairs
and ‘colossal authority’ in the countries of the Third World.
He also stated that ‘in these countries, there are great hopes
that Russia will restore its earlier positions in world affairs’
(Bourtman, 2006).Mereﬂattery, however,wasnot enough to
satisfy the Kremlin. In the context of UN Security Council
debates concerning the Syrian presence in Lebanon, the
Russians alternated support for initiatives favourable and
moderately hostile to their partner in Damascus. Al-Asad
understood the message and started to align systematically
his positions on those of the Kremlin. He supported the pro-
Moscow leader of Chechnya and, in 2008, the Russian inva-
sion of South Ossetia (Glasman, 2011e2012; Hinnebusch,
2010: 21).
Due to these efforts, the bilateral relations started to
evolve toward a status reminiscent of the old Soviet-Syrian
partnership. During a Moscow visit in 2006, Asad and
Putin announced each other as the most important strategic
partners in the Middle East and emphasized the multi-
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2007: 131e132). Bilateral trade increased from $218
million in 2004 to $460 million one year later and to $1
billion in 2008 (Glasman, 2011e2012; Tawil & Mostajo,
2009: 792). Russian companies became important in-
vestors in the Syrian oil and gas extraction industry. In 2012,
Syria owed $3.6 billion to Russia. Much of this debt was
associated with arms contracts; the active ones had, also in
2012, an estimated value of $4.5 billion (Smith, 2012: 13).
Between 75 and 90 percent of Syria's new arms are Russian-
made. One quarter of the weapons produced in Russia be-
tween 2005 and 2009 were exported to Damascus
(Glasman, 2011e2012; The Economist, 9 June 2012g).
Moreover, in 2006e2007 about 2000 Russian military ad-
visors were sent to Syria to train its armed forces (Rubin,
2007: 55). Perhaps more importantly, in 2009 Moscow
started modernizing the former Soviet naval station at Tar-
tus, which represents Russia's only military base outside the
former USSR. At their completion e initially scheduled for
2012 e the new installations would have been able to host
Moscow's largest warships, including the nuclear-powered
missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky, thus extending considerably
Russia's naval projection capability (Glasman, 2011e2012;
The Economist, 9 June 2012g; The Economist, 14 January
2012b). In other words, at the beginning of the Arab
Spring Syria was well advanced in the process of acquiring a
foreign protector while the Kremlin had found a valuable
ally able to enhance its great power status in the Middle
East.
11. Russia and Syria's bloody Spring
Russian support for the regime in Damascus has been
constant and effective, both at the bilateral and international
levels. Bilaterally, Russia has been one of the very few
countries willing and able to sell the weapons and ammu-
nition increasinglyneededby the al-Asad repressive forces. It
also dispatched to Syria warships, diplomats, and even a
patriarch meant to enforce the regime by showing that it
beneﬁtted from the robust support of a great power. In
January 2012, the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft-carrier and a
few other Russian warships were welcomed at the Syrian
port of Tartus by Assad's defence minister, Daoud Rajha
(Glasman, 2011e2012). Later that month, Moscow also sold
$550 m worth of ﬁghter jets to Syria (The Economist, 28
January 2012d). In January 2013, ships from all four Russian
ﬂeets assembled in the Eastern Mediterranean for their
biggest naval exercises since the downfall of the Soviet Union
(Trenin, 2013: 12). In more than one occasion, the Russian
foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, had ‘productive’ meetings
with Bashar al-Asad. To give an example, on 7 February 2012
he visited Damascus and was greeted by cheering crowds
supporting the Syrian dictator, whose commitment to
‘speedy reforms’ Lavrov praised (Smith, 2012: 16; The
Economist, 11 February 2012). Most interestingly, in
November 2011 Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and all the Rus'
and Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church, paid a visit to
Syria (Glasman, 2011e2012). The close links between the
Russian Church and the Kremlin are hardly a secret. The visit
was clearly political in character and was part of Moscow's
larger pro-al-Asad propaganda campaign. Thirteen percentof the Syrians are Christian (Rubin, 2007: 28). Like other
minorities and especially the ‘Alawi one, Christians fear the
Sunni fundamentalists in the rebels’ ranks and have been
perceived as supporting the regime. Kirill's visit exploited
precisely this fear in order to increase domestic solidarity
with and support for thedictator inDamascus. It also showed
Moscow's good knowledge of the situation in Syria and its
determination to assist al-Asad in any possible way.
Yet, it was at the international level that Russian support
proved most effective. Trying to avoid isolation, Moscow
mobilized a group of inﬂuent allies in favour of its Syrian
ally. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Af-
rica) are major emerging economic powers that share the
explicit goal of replacing US hegemony with a more
balanced multipolar order. For this reason and due to its
speciﬁc interests in the Middle East (see Yu, 2012: 143),
China had adopted from the very beginning a pro-al-Asad
stance. This, however, was not the case for the remaining
three members of the group. It was only after the March
2012 BRICS annual summit and especially after the 11th
BRICS Foreign Ministerial Meeting held in Moscow in April
2012 that Russian and Chinese persuasive efforts proved
successful. India, followed by the two other states, moved
signiﬁcantly toward Kremlin's position (Glasman,
2011e2012; Yu, 2012: 143e4).
The three countries, however, were unable to inﬂuence
signiﬁcantly the key arena of the United Nations Security
Council. This iswhyRussia had to actwith the only supportof
China. The two states blocked three anti-al-AsadUNSecurity
Council resolutions on 4 October 2011, 4 February 2012, and
19 July 2012, respectively (The Economist,11 February 2012;
The New York Times, 19 July 2012). On 2 December 2011, 1
March 2012, and 6 July 2012 they also opposed UN Human
Rights Council resolutions condemning the Syrian govern-
ment (Glasman, 2011e2012; Yu, 2012: 142) while on 16
February 2012 and on 3 August 2012 they voted against
similar UN General Assembly resolutions (Reuters, 3 August
2012; Yu, 2012: 142). The Russian approach iswell illustrated
by the case of the May 2012 Houla massacre. The Kremlin
denounced it, but e outraging the US as well as many Eu-
ropean and Middle Eastern states e claimed that ‘killings
bore the marks of both sides’ (The Economist, 9 June 2012g).
In general, Moscow has made a constant effort to present its
actions as a balanced quest for a political solution to the
conﬂict. It frequently has claimed that its rejection of ‘uni-
lateral,’ anti-al-Asad initiatives was due exclusively to the
fact that such actions had no chance of success. To quote
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, ‘it is completely un-
realistic (… ) to say that the only way out is the unilateral
capitulation of one of the opposing sides.’ Such an idea is
‘naive’ (RFE/RL, 1 September 2012). In fact, the systematic
actions of the Kremlin have preventedWestern powers from
getting a UN Security Council resolution that could serve as
legal basis for a Libyan-type intervention in Syria. This
limited greatly the freedom of manoeuvre of anti-al-Asad
states and diminished the legitimacy of their hostile ac-
tions. If the other elements mentioned earlier in this section
are added, it is clear that Russian support has been instru-
mental in the survival of the Syrian regime.
It is interesting to see how Russians themselves explain
this considerable effort. Moscow's line of reasoning was
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Moscow Centre. In his opinion, to Russia, ‘Syria is not pri-
marily about Middle Eastern geopolitics, Cold War-era al-
liances, arms sales or (… ) the Tartus naval resupply facility.’
These are relevant, but Moscow is more interested in two
other key elements. First, ‘Syria is primarily about theworld
order. It is about who decides’ e with a direct reference to
America's use of force that ‘might lead to foreign in-
terventions close to Russian borders, or even within those
borders’ (Trenin, 2012; emphasis in the original). Second,
there is the danger of Islamist radical groups gaining a
foothold just a few hundred miles from Russia's own
troubled North Caucasus (Trenin, 2012). Beyond these
speciﬁc concerns, however, Trenin also mentioned a crucial
aspect. After the political ‘decoupling’ from the West, Vla-
dimir Putin ‘began to vigorously promote Russia's distinct
identity, which now openly differs from the West at the
values level, not just diplomatically.’ Such a move repre-
sents ‘a fundamental shift in Russia's standing and position
in theworld. Syria is just one example of this’ (Trenin, 2013:
23; my emphasis). The Kremlin's Syrian policy, then, is in
fact an exercise in identity-building. It helps construct a
great power identity whose features include the rejection
of US interventionism and the securing of areas close to
national borders. To Moscow, Syria itself is of secondary
importance. It is the transformative process associatedwith
this Middle Eastern partnership that is crucial to Russia's
new international identity.
12. Conclusion
The previous sections support three broad conclusions.
First, the MoscoweDamascus bilateral relationship was
hardly the only process of international socialization
affecting the two states. Regionally and globally, each of
them also interacted with other partners and was inﬂu-
enced by those interactions. However, it is clear that during
more than four decades the RussianeSyrian relationship
was extremely important in shaping the two partners' ac-
tions and identities. Critically, it considerably inﬂuenced
their international status. Second, chronologically there
were three very different stages of this partnership, with
the middle one marked by the total suspension of the
special bilateral relations. In fact, it is this critical period
that is the most illustrative of the importance the part-
nership had for both sides. It witnessed the Kremlin's
temporary but dramatic impotence on the global arena that
placed Syria in an almost desperate international position.
Russia's reassertion of great power status was accompanied
by the progressive reconstruction of the previous bilateral
relations which in turn improved greatly Damascus'
regional position while allowing Moscow to initiate the
symbolically important creation of its ﬁrst military base
outside the former Soviet Union. Both states beneﬁtted
from the renewed partnership in a way going largely
beyond simple policy adjustments and clearly affecting
their International Relations identity. Third, the Arab Spring
had complex and contradictory effects. By endangering the
very existence of the al-Asad regime, it put the Dam-
ascuseMoscow partnership to a very serious stress test.
The Russian reaction was robust and, at ﬁrst view,conﬁrmed the Kremlin's unconditional support for its
Middle Eastern ally. Yet, as shown below, certain signals
suggest that the situation is qualitatively different from
that of the Cold War and therefore the parallel with the
SyrianeSoviet relationship might be misleading.
12.1. The reciprocal constitutive features of the Cold War
period
Back in the 1970s, the heavy reliance on the Soviet
Union's multifaceted assistance was constitutive to the
identity of Syria as an International Relations actor. Politi-
cally, militarily, and economically the al-Asad regime could
not have survived without external support due to two key
factors. On the one hand, there was Syria's domestic
instability, favoured by inter-community tensions. The
posteindependence state was weak while national con-
sciousness was still unconsolidated. On the other hand,
there was the external vulnerability to Israeli military ac-
tions as well as to other regional threats in the larger
context of the turbulent Middle East. Consequently, Dam-
ascus required, received, and fully exploited considerable
Soviet support that allowed it to become a regional power
whose foreign policy was clearly anti-Israeli and anti-
Western. At the same time, domestically al-Asad built a
strongly authoritarian regime that imported the Soviet
personality cult and some other ‘socialist’ features. This is
to say that Syria's new identity took shape through a pro-
cess of socialization speciﬁc to USSR's ‘family’ of Third
World allies and clients. Of course, Damascus could not
inﬂuence in the same way the identity of the Soviet Union.
Yet, it would be wrong to perceive the SyrianeSoviet
partnership as a purely unilateral transformative process.
The Kremlin's international actions, interests, and identity
also were inﬂuenced signiﬁcantly by the interaction with
the numerous group of allies of which Syria was a repre-
sentative example. After World War II, the transformation
of the USSR into a truly global superpower could not be
dissociated from the support and instrumentalization of
regimes like those of Syria, South Yemen, Libya, Cuba,
Angola or Vietnam. The Kremlin used them but also had to
take into consideration and accommodate their speciﬁc
needs and interests, modifying its own views, policies, and
International Relations identity accordingly. This is why
during the Cold War the DamascuseMoscow constitutive
relationwas a reciprocal one. Moreover, its intensity, length
and stability were such that initial role playing was pro-
gressively replaced by the more advanced Type II socializ-
ation and its ‘logic of appropriateness.’ Both the USSR and
Syria genuinely perceived themselves as members of a
superpower-regional ally partnership and acted
accordingly.
12.2. History repeats itself, but only in part
Everything appeared to come to an end after the Cold
War. New identities were forged. Under Yeltsin, Moscow
turned into a weak power struggling to maintain control of
its former Soviet neighbourhood and totally unable to play
a signiﬁcant role in the Middle East. Damascus became an
isolated, insecure state forced to rely increasingly on Iran.
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American Middle Eastern strategy set up in response to the
US invasion of Iraq progressively recreated the framework
of the previous cooperation. Despite the generational
change, the Syrian regime was as eager as three decades
earlier to use Moscow's support in order to improve its
international status. The Kremlin believed that providing
arms to Damascus, training its military, and building a naval
facility at Tartus was the best way to reassert its great
power status in theMiddle East. The partnership developed
in a way mirroring at least in part the 1970s relations.
Finally, the Arab Spring gave Moscow the opportunity to
support its Syrian ally with arms and Security Council
vetoes exactly as it had done during the Cold War. At ﬁrst
view, the history has been repeating itself.
There are, however, two major differences. First, the
complex reality of the new relationship requires a ﬁnessed
and nuanced assessment. Both partners ﬁnd themselves in
critical stages of their identity development. Present Russia
is not the powerful, self-conﬁdent Soviet Union. Its reas-
sertion of great power status only has started one decade
ago. The Kremlin leader still faces some anti-authoritarian
criticism at home and serious challenges abroad, not to
mention rather limited resources. His political project needs
more time to come to maturity and, during this transitory
phase, Moscow preserves a certain degree of vulnerability.
For its part, the 44-year old Syrian regime is experiencing its
darkest hour. It has been reduced to a killing apparatus that
tries tomaintain international honourability. As it ﬁghts for
its very survival, the range of its political choices as well as
the ensuing responsiveness to domestic and external inputs
have diminished considerably. The partnership, then, is
plagued by signiﬁcant weaknesses and should not be ex-
pected to work as it did thirty years ago. Most importantly,
for the time being it has little chances to go beyond the role
playing, Type I socialization. This means that, in the fore-
seeable future, it will remain rather superﬁcial and might
break at the ﬁrst serious shock.
The second difference stems from the present structure
of the international system. Unlike the USSR, the new
Russia is not the lethal enemy of the US. It does not reject
radically the present international order. If Wendt's cul-
tures of anarchy are taken into consideration, the Moscow-
Washington relationship is one of Lockean rivalry. This
hardlymeans friendship, but also is far from total adversity.
Russian foreign policy in the Middle East might follow
patterns inspired by the Soviet ones, but this does not mean
that the identities of Russia and of the USSR are the same.
Consequently, Russian-American crises are unlikely to take
extreme forms and an understanding between the two
states is always possible. With respect to the Syrian case,
this means that Russia will never go as far as the Soviet
Union in order to protect its ally. In 2004, Lavrov stated ‘the
foreign policy of Russia is neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israeli.
It is directed at securing Russian national interests’
(Glasman, 2011e2012). Three years later, Andrej Kreutz
noted that ‘Putin's relations with Syria and the rest of the
Arab World have been cautious and marked by self-
interested pragmatism’ (Kreutz, 2007: 25). During the
Arab Spring, the Kremlin has supported al-Asad vocally and
effectively because this served its own global interests.However, in the case of military defeat of the Syrian regime
it is unlikely that Putin will choose to escalate his country's
support for an almost lost cause. He will not call for sanc-
tions against states helping the rebels, he will not threaten
to send Russian troops to Syria, and he will not harbour an
al-Asad government in exile as the Soviets might have
done. He probably will prefer to ‘secure Russian national
interests’ by negotiating with his rivals in Washington. This
is not a simple speculation. On 13 December 2012, the
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated
that Syria's government was ‘progressively losing control’
and that ‘the victory of the Syrian opposition cannot be
excluded’ (BBC, 14 December 2012). One day later, the
Foreign Ministry denied that Moscow had changed its pro-
al-Asad position. Still, nothing happened to Bogdanov,
which is highly atypical for a Russian ofﬁcial expressing
opinions that contradict Putin's views. It is likely that this
was a signal suggesting that Moscow could contemplate a
change of its Syrian policy as the military actions of the
rebels looked, at that time, increasingly successful. Later,
the chances of survival of the regime in Damascus some-
how improved and the Kremlin didn't need to prepare for a
worst case scenario, at least in the short run. But this re-
mains a possibility for the future. Ironically, it is not sure
that such signals will be answered. As noted by Erol Cebeci
and Kadir Üstün, ‘the US does not see sufﬁciently vital in-
terests in Syria to be (… ) worth seriously bargaining for’
(Cebeci & Üstün, 2012: 21). Even in that case, the Kremlin
probably will choose moderation.
To sum up, for a long time and in a very profound way,
the DamascuseMoscow partnership has been a reciprocal
constitutive relation. During the last two decades of the
Cold War it represented an almost ideal-type example of a
relationship between a super-power and its regional ally
that, through its complex consequences, shaped signiﬁ-
cantly the two partners themselves, the Middle Eastern
political and security environment, and the international
system as a whole. Post-2003 developments and especially
the present Syrian crisis also have inﬂuenced considerably
the two states' identity-building processes. Yet, today the
International Relations identity of Russia is very different
from that of the Cold War period. The main consequence is
that, despite patterns of bilateral cooperation that seem to
mirror those of the Soviet era, Moscow's new identity
prevents it from perceiving its relations with the Syrian
government as a matter of life and death. Damascus is
instrumental in Russia's reassertion of great power status.
However, if that is the course of military operations, the
Kremlin should be expected to accept the possible fall of its
ally and to adapt its Middle Eastern policy to the new
regional context.
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